Religious extremism in Georgia

Author

Nodar Ladaria was born in Sokhumi, Abkhazia, in 1960. A physicist by education, Nodar entered the Tbilisi Ecclesiastical Academy in 1989. He studied in Rome in 1992-96 (Pontificio Istituto Orientale or "Pontifical Oriental Institute"). Nodar was given an academic degree of Doctor of Science in Oriental Church in 1996. He is presently an assistant professor at the Tbilisi University of Language and Culture and press ombudsman for Otsdaotkhi Saati ("Twenty-four Hours") daily newspaper.

As a rule, religious extremism is identified with violence. The most vivid manifestations of violence on a religious basis in Georgia are linked with Vasilii Mkalavishvili, a former priest of the Georgian Orthodox Church, degraded from the priesthood by a resolution of the Holy Synod. Vasilii Mkalavishvili had been on the wanted list from March 19, 2004, charged with property destruction, and he was arrested along with several associates on March 19, 2004. A legal action has already been brought against them, too. This is how the biggest hotbed of utter religious extremism was neutralized.

However, Vasilii Mkalavishvili's significance was not exhausted by extremist activities of his flock that caused special sufferings to evangelic Christians and Jehovah's Witnesses. The so-called "Gldani Eparchy" he headed was, so to speak, the tip of a whole iceberg of social phenomena that can be described as religious extremism. Various parts of this rather big iceberg display all sorts of attitudes to pogroms carried out by "Gldani Eparchy" members: from direct involvement to passive approval, from connivance to noninterference.

It would be of use to introduce a certain classification to clarify this picture. Before that, however, one should mention the two properties of religious extremism in Georgia: 1) most religious extremists are Orthodox believers; 2) religious extremism is closely connected with nationalist sentiments in society and is used by them as a vehicle. The proposed classification of religious extremism that has switched completely to ideologically colored language forms after Mkalavishvili's arrest will be based on the answers to these two questions: who? and against whom?

These criteria enable dividing religious extremism into four basic types formed by the crossing of the following lines: the church and the laity against "insiders" and "outsiders."

1. The laity against "outsiders": so-called sects are the key object of religious persecution here. The word "sect" is used as a rule to indicate all non-Orthodox religious trends, save, probably for the Catholic Church, the Armenian Gregorian Church, Islam and Judaism; however, people's consciousness easily identifies various denominations of evangelic Christians (Lutheran, Baptist, Pentecostal) as "sects." In doing so, the general public in Georgia is rather passive in their extremist moods representing a sort of readiness, certain silent approval of any actions against the establishment in Georgia of freedom of consciousness and religion.

The most active part of the population that can be referred to as belonging to this part of the proposed classification consists on the one hand of fundamentalist parishes grouped around some Orthodox priests and on the other hand political figures (including representatives of all sorts of parties and trends, so that it seems impossible to describe them more specifically). Fundamentalist parishes guided by their pastors' will from time to time shape groups of pressure on the Patriarch. Any event can serve as a basis for such actions: a planned Georgian art show abroad, a wish to replace Georgian polyphonic singing with Greek monophony, introducing the optional subject "sexual education" to Georgia's secondary schools, etc. Priest Zaza Tevzadze in an interview with Otsdaotkhi Saati explains this phenomenon with absence of a sufficient level of Christian education among Orthodox parishes, which leads to a sort of primeval religiousness. A bent for a conspiracy theory is the most widespread vision of the world among these believers: various myths about a Masonic conspiracy against the Orthodox Georgia are very popular. Now conspiracy leverage is seen in the Rustavi-2 television company, now in the Education Ministry, now in the Georgian government, but most often in civil society. Until recently, such sentiments had actively been supported and spread by Georgian politicians (G. Sharadze, J. Bagaturia), but nearly all political parties with low popularity ratings staked on such moods in the public after President Shevardnadze's resignation, trying to portray Vasilii Mkalavishvili's quite legal arrest as a flagrant human rights violation.

Above all, the following factors determining this type of extremism can be singled out: 1) a low level of religious education among Georgia's Orthodox believers; 2) identifying denomination with ethnicity; 3) a tendency to encourage fundamentalist moods in the public on the part of political forces believing that such moods can turn out to be a favorable condition to gain votes in elections; 4) an inflow of fundamentalist literature from Russia and Greece.

2. The laity against "insiders": this type of religious extremism is the least common in Georgia, but that doesn't make it less dangerous. The most fertile soil for it is found in the low qualification of schoolteachers of religion and culture. The absence of appropriately qualifying teachers and the very concept of the subject makes the latter a perverted version of God's Law. Primary school children suffer the worst effects of such teaching on their psyche.

3. The church against "outsiders": the Georgian Orthodox Church connives at extremism and religious intolerance with its passivity and refusal to take up a definite position on the one hand; with obviously extremist tendencies periodically turning up in its official documents or in publications under its aegis on the other hand. The most vivid example is the statement by the Patriarch in the early 1990s that any Georgian killing a Georgian would be put down in a special book for future generations to shame (what is meant is that killing an Ossetian or a Russian would be considered a smaller sin). One should also mention the obvious appeals for violence with regard to people of other creeds repeatedly voiced by Bishop Athanasius (Chakhvashvili) of Bodbi and the destruction of wall painting in a former Catholic church in Gori. For a series of years, the Church had rather languidly renounced Mkalavishvili's extremist activities, but a statement by the press center of the Georgian Patriarchate after his arrest clearly conveyed a wish that the Georgian government itself proceed with repressions against Jehovah's Witnesses. The obstruction of a pact between Georgia and the Holy See (state of Vatican) in 2003 is to be considered a manifestation of extremism on the part of the Church, too.

The most important factor promoting this type of extremism is the withdrawal of the Georgian Orthodox Church from the World Council of Churches and the Conference of European Churches in 1997. Thus, the Orthodox Church got rid of the need to allow for values acknowledged by the international Christian, including Orthodox, community.

4. The Church against "insiders": every minister of church venturing a remark against isolationism and extremism inside the Georgian Orthodox Church thereby dooms himself to repressions on the part of fundamentalist clergy and their parishes. The evidence is that canvassing is underway for the Holy Synod to consider degrading priests Vasilii Kobakhidze, Zaza Tevzadze and Georgii Chachava from the priesthood. Counter to all canon law regulations, these ministers of church are persecuted for their activities which extremist groups view as support to ecumenism and freedom of consciousness and religion.

This type of extremism comprises piles of low-quality publications through which the Georgian Orthodox Church promotes isolationism, intolerance and antidemocratic, anti-cultural sentiments among very large circles of the population.

Published on April 7, 2004